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Sammendrag 
Mange land kombinerer avgifter på drivstoff med avgiftsfritak og subsidier til lav- og nullutslippsbiler 
for å redusere utslippet av drivhusgasser, samt for å dempe ulemper som ulykker, køer og lokal 
forurensing. Denne studien analyserer hvordan disse virkemidlene bør kombineres for å realisere en 
samfunnsøkonomisk effektiv allokering av høy- og lavutslippskjøretøy som tar hensyn til slike 
ulemper.        
 
Studien viser at ekstraavgiften per liter drivstoff i forhold til ordinære konsumgoder bør være lik 
kostnaden forbundet med CO2 utslippet per liter drivstoff pluss gjennomsnittlig kostnad forbundet 
med veibruksrelaterte ulemper per liter drivstoff. Den CO2- relaterte avgiften på drivstoff innebærer at 
husholdninger tar hensyn til kostnaden forbundet med utslipp av CO2 når de tilpasser omfanget av 
kjøring. Kjøretøy med lavere (høyere) drivstofforbruk enn gjennomsnittet påføres en veibruksavgift på 
drivstoff som er lavere (høyere) enn ulempene som påfører samfunnet.  
 
En effektiv beskatning av kjøretøy utlikner avviket mellom veibruksrelaterte kostnader og 
veibruksrelaterte avgifter på drivstoff for de forskjellige kjøretøyene. Lavutslippskjøretøy bør derfor 
skattlegges kraftigere enn høyutslippskjøretøy i fravær av andre sosiale kostnader og gevinster. 
Ekstraavgiften på lavutslippskjøretøy kombinert med avgiften på drivstoff innebærer at husholdninger 
med rasjonelle forventninger tar hensyn til veibruksrelaterte kostnader samt kostnader forbundet med 
utslipp av CO2 når de velger kjøretøy. Elbiler som fritas fra veibruksavgifter i Norge bør av samme 
grunn ilegges en ekstra avgift i forhold til bensin- og dieselbiler på om lag 7.000 kroner per år i fravær 
av andre sosiale kostnader og gevinster. Dette forutsetter bl.a. at den teknologiske utviklingen av 
elbiler er upåvirket av den norske politikken, at norske utslippsforpliktelser innfris med kvotekjøp, 
samt at subsidier til nye ladestasjoner tilpasses for å høste eventuelle gevinster forbundet med 
utbygging av ladestasjoner. Et slikt avgiftssystem avviker kraftig fra det norske, med omfattende 
avgiftsfritak for lav- og nullutslippsbiler.    
 
Ekstraavgiften for lav- og nullutslippsbiler reduseres når det antas at husholdninger er kortsynte, og 
fjernes helt hvis GPS-baserte veibruksavgifter innføres. Den forenklede teoretiske analysen tar ikke 
hensyn til andre sosiale gevinster og tap, ekskluderer mer komplekse avveininger, og utelater andre 
transportpolitiske virkemidler. 
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1. Introduction   
Road transport is essential to maintain a good flow of goods, services and people.  Road transport also 
generates costly negative externalities connected to CO2 emissions, local air pollution, accidents, 
congestion and noise. Many countries have implemented taxes on fuel to curb externalities linked to 
both fuel and mileage. The gain of reduced externalities per liter fuel is however diminished as 
households avoid the mileage-related tax by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. Parry and Small 
(2005) claim that the optimal mileage-related tax rate component on fuel is halved due to such 
avoidance. Differentiated taxes on high- and low-emission vehicles are however excluded from the 
model framework in Parry and Small (2005). The aim of this study is to shed light on the second-best 
optimal uniform tax on fuel combined with differentiated taxes on vehicles to curb externalities linked 
to both consumption of fuel and road use. The study shows that the optimal mileage- related tax rate 
component on fuel should not be reduced as such avoidance should be neutralized by a higher tax on 
fuel-efficient vehicles. Many countries have, in contrast, introduced tax exemptions or subsidies for 
fuel-efficient vehicles.                   
 
Parry and Small (2005) calculate the optimal uniform tax rate on petrol, and shows that the optimal tax 
rate on petrol in the United States was more than twice as large as the current rate, while that for the 
United Kingdom was about half its current rate. Their significant methodological contribution have 
inspired a range of other studies to calculate optimal tax rates on fuel in other countries, see e.g. 
Anton-Sarabia and Hernandez-Trillo (2014), Lin and Zeng (2014). Several objections can however be 
made to the methodology in these studies. First, differentiated taxes on purchase of vehicles are as 
mentioned not considered even though Innes (1996), Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) and De Borger 
(2001) shows that restrictions on taxes on use of vehicles imply that taxes on purchase of vehicles are 
desirable. Indeed, subsidizing substitutes of polluting goods might be desirable when the government 
is unable to tax emissions directly, see Sandmo (1976). Second, their optimal tax rate on petrol 
includes a Ramsey tax component. A general set of assumptions however excludes the Ramsey tax 
component from a welfare maximizing tax system according to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)1. Indeed, 
Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) show that a Pigouvian tax on polluting goods is part of a welfare 
maximizing tax system within a Mirrlees economy framework2. The second-best optimal tax rate on 
                                                     
1 Taxation of consumer goods designed to redistribute income is also rejected.    
2 Results in the literature differ on the issue of whether environmental taxes should deviate from the Pigouvian rate due to tax 
revenue requirements. The optimal tax rate in Parry and Small (2005) is lower due to tax revenue requirements. Jaeger 
(2011), however, finds that the need for tax revenues contributes to increase the optimal environmental tax wedge above the 
Pigouvian tax rate. The optimal CO2 tax also exceeds the quota price when the government purchase quotas and the marginal 
cost of public funds exceed one according to Bjertnæs et. al. (2013).  
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fuel is however lowered due to tax revenue considerations with an emerging electric vehicle market, 
see Tscharaktschiew (2015). A lower tax on fuel reduces the incentive to switch to lower taxed electric 
vehicles, which ultimately expands other distorting taxes to satisfy the government budget constraint.  
  
The optimal design of taxes on both fuel and vehicles in the pioneering contributions of Innes (1996) 
and Fullerton and West (2002) provides the theoretical foundation for results derived within the 
present study. Innes (1996) do not quantify optimal tax wedges on fuel or vehicles, but the main 
insight is that second-best optimal vehicle taxes approximately equals the social cost of a vehicle’s 
predicted emissions, less the portion of costs that are internalized by the gasoline tax. Fullerton and 
West (2002) extends the analysis, and show that vehicles with bigger engines, and hence, higher fuel 
consumption should be subsidized as a tax on fuel which equals the marginal damage per gallon of 
fuel more than completely internalize the impact of engine size. Fullerton and West (2010) extends the 
analysis in Fullerton and West (2002) with vehicle age, and simulates different scenarios which 
confirm their previous result. They find that the three-part instrument involving a gas tax, an engine 
size subsidy, and a new-car subsidy maximize welfare. The welfare gain of implementing the engine 
size subsidy however does not significantly increase welfare. The insightful analysis in Fullerton and 
West (2002, 2010) however leave several questions unanswered. First, the welfare gain of reduced 
externalities per gallon of fuel is diminished as households avoid the mileage-related tax by 
purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. It is not clear whether the optimal tax on fuel in Fullerton and 
West (2002) should be adjusted for such avoidance. Second, a tax on fuel which equals the marginal 
damage of CO2-emissions will perfectly internalizes CO2-emissions due to a bigger engine. Hence, it 
is not clear whether CO2-emission-intensive vehicles should be subsidized. Third, several empirical 
studies find that households have rational expectations when purchasing vehicles, see Sallee et al 
(2016) and Busse et al (2013). Some studies however find support for partly myopic behavior, see 
Grigolon etc. (2014) and Allcott and Wozny (2014). Myopic behavior is not considered by Innes 
(1996) or Fullerton and West (2002, 2010). 
 
These objections to Parry and Small (2005) and Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) is resolved in this 
study by calculating taxes on fuel and vehicles designed to curb externalities from road transport. A 
partial model framework of the transport sector is employed where heterogeneous households choose 
type of vehicle and driving distance. The government chooses taxes to maximize an individualistic 
welfare function. Tax revenue collected is transferred to households without distorting the economy. 
Hence, optimal taxes are obtained by balancing the efficiency cost of taxation against the welfare gain 
of reduced externalities. This optimum condition is consistent with the optimum condition for 
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environmental goods in Jacobs and de Mooij (2015). The Pigouvian solution is however excluded 
when policy instruments are restricted to a uniform tax on fuel combined with differentiated taxes on 
vehicles. Optimal taxes are then compared with current taxes in selected countries. Issues in Parry and 
Small (2005) concerning omitted taxation of vehicles and Ramsey tax components, and issues in 
Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) concerning the impact of tax avoidance and myopic behavior are 
solved by this approach. Hence, the main contribution of this study consists of calculating optimal 
combinations of taxes on fuel and vehicles that are comparable with current taxes in selected 
countries.      
 
The study shows that the optimal tax on fuel equals the marginal damage of CO2 emissions plus the 
weighted average marginal damage of mileage-related costs of road transport in the case with rational 
expectations3. The CO2-tax on fuel provides appropriate incentives for mileage. The road user charge 
on fuel exceeds mileage-related externalities for vehicles with higher than average fuel consumption 
per mile. Hence, mileage for such vehicles is too low from a social planner’s point of view. The road 
user charge is lower than the mileage-related externalities for fuel-efficient vehicles. Mileage for such 
vehicles is too high from a social planner’s point of view. Distortions in mileage due to such 
differences are however optimal in a second-best solution where policy tools are restricted to a 
uniform tax on fuel combined with differentiated taxes on vehicles.   
 
Taxes on fuel are fully accounted for by households with rational expectations who purchase a vehicle. 
Hence, the CO2-tax on fuel provides appropriate incentives for choice of vehicle in this case. The 
choice of vehicle is however distorted by the mileage-related tax on fuel as taxes deviate from 
externalities. An optimal additional tax on fuel-efficient vehicles which neutralizes these differences 
between road user charges on fuel and mileage-related externalities imply that households face correct 
costs of externalities when choosing vehicle. Hence, avoidance of road user charges on fuel by 
purchasing fuel-efficient vehicles should be neutralized by a tax on fuel-efficient vehicles in this case. 
 
Myopic behavior implies that households underestimate the benefits of purchasing fuel-efficient 
vehicles. It is optimal to correct for such behavior by reducing the tax on fuel-efficient vehicles. The 
study illustrate the impact of myopic behavior by calculating the optimal tax wedge between different 
Volkswagen Passat models, and shows that the optimal tax on low emission models exceeds the tax on 
                                                     
3 This result is consistent with the result in Diamond (1973). The optimal road user charge on fuel is however reduced below 
the marginal cost of mileage- related externalities when economic driving is considered, see Bjertnæs (2017). The tax is 
reduced to prevent costs of road tax avoidance due to economic driving.  
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high emission models, also in the case with myopic behavior. Jansen and Denis (1999) conclude that 
the desired policy mix to reduce CO2-emissions consists of a tax on fuel combined with differentiated 
purchase taxes to correct for myopic behavior. A mileage-tax is however introduced into their model 
simulations to reduce mileage-related emissions.   
 
The optimal tax on polluting goods is sensitive to the tax on non-polluting goods, according to the 
discussion of normalization in Fullerton (1997). Hence, the optimal tax on fuel designed to curb 
externalities is compared with current tax wedges between fuel and non-polluting goods to avoid this 
problem4. The comparison, which includes fees on toll roads, uncovers substantial room for 
improvements. The current US tax wedge, 37.3 cents per gallon, is way below the optimal tax wedge, 
2.36 dollars per gallon. The current UK and German tax wedge is also lower than the optimal tax 
wedge. The Norwegian tax wedge, however, is higher. The road user charge is to a large extent levied 
on fuel within all these countries. Hence, it is optimal to tax fuel-efficient vehicles more heavily to 
neutralize avoidance of the road user charge on fuel. Substantial tax exemptions for purchase of 
vehicles are in contrast introduced in all countries except for the US where the tax wedge is modest.         
 
The lack of road user charges for electric vehicles implies that the optimal additional tax on electric 
vehicles equals the life time value of mileage-related externalities for electric vehicles when other 
market imperfections are absent. Substantial differences in mileage-related costs between geographic 
regions call for geographic tax differentiation between regions. Implementation of geographic tax 
differentiation favor a yearly vehicle tax as differentiated taxes on purchase is more likely to be 
hampered by evasion. Tax exemptions and/or subsidies for purchase of electric vehicles are in contrast 
introduced in all selected countries, although some US states have introduced annual road user fees for 
electric vehicles.  
 
Some limitations should be considered when results are interpreted. The optimal vehicle tax is based 
on theoretical emissions per mile. Such taxes are however hampered by evasion as several car 
manufacturers have been caught manipulating emissions per mile-tests. A simple one-period model 
framework where households with specific preferences for driving and type of vehicle chose driving 
distance and type of vehicle suggest that results are limited to specific settings. Optimal tax-formulas 
are however determined by the damage fuel and vehicles inflict upon society. Such damage is 
                                                     
4 The optimal tax rate on petrol in Parry and Small (2005) equals the optimal tax wedge between petrol and non-polluting 
goods as the tax rate on non-polluting goods is set equal to zero. This tax wedge is however compared with current tax rates 
on petrol, and not current tax wedges between petrol and non-polluting goods. 
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determined by empirical estimates. Policy tools are restricted to a uniform tax on fuel combined with 
differentiated taxes on vehicles. Allowing for vehicle specific taxes on fuel or a GPS-based tax on 
driving removes the problem with avoidance of road user charges on fuel. The study shows that the tax 
wedge between high- and low-emission vehicles should be zero in the absence of other market 
imperfections in this case. Both these solutions lead to a more efficient allocation of vehicles and 
driving distance compared to the second-best solution presented above. Such systems are on the other 
hand more costly to administer.  
2. The model framework    
2.1 Households     
Households choose driving distance and type of vehicle with different fuel economy. Household si'
utility, iu , net of externalities is given by the quasilinear utility function  
(1) iiii cbkmuu ++= )( , with a fuel-intensive vehicle and iii ckmuu += )(  with a fuel-effi-
cient vehicle.  
The utility is determined by driving distance measured in kilometer, ikm , consumer goods, ic , and the 
utility connected to owning a fuel-intensive vehicle instead of a fuel-efficient vehicle, ib . This utility 
parameter differs between households as transport needs and requirements differ between households. 
Some households may prefer the fuel-efficient vehicle, i.e. their utility parameter, ib , is negative. The 
household budget constraint is  
(2) jcarjcarijlli ptkmftpkyc ,,)( −−+−+= , where lowhighj ,=  indicates vehicle with 
high and low fuel consumption per kilometer.  
Income, y , and transfers, k , are fixed for households. The cost of using the vehicle is given by the 
price of fuel, lp , the tax on fuel, lt , the theoretical fuel economy measured in liters per kilometer, jf , 
and driving distance in kilometer, ikm . Vehicle maintenance and capital depreciation is excluded 
from the operating costs of vehicles to simplify the model framework. A tax designed to correct for 
negative externalities is however not influenced by such operating costs when externalities are not 
influenced by such operating costs5. The cost of purchasing a vehicle is determined by the producer 
                                                     
5 Maintenance could e.g. be preserved by maintenance control. 
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price, jcarp , , plus the tax, jcart , . The tax on purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles, highcart , , equals cart . 
The tax on purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles equals zero. Note that theoretical fuel-efficiency equals 
actual fuel-efficiency within the model framework even though deviations and even cheating is 
observed in the real world. Utility maximization with respect to ikm imply that    
(3) jllkm ftpu i )(' += . 
Hence,  
(4) )( lji tdkm = , where lowhighj ,=  indicates each type of vehicle.  
Demand for driving distance is identical for individuals with identical vehicles. The indirect utility 
function net of externalities for each household, i , with each type of vehicle is found by implementing 
equation (2) into equation (1), and then implementing equation (4).    
(5) highcarcarlhighhighllilhighhighi pttdftpkybtduv ,, )()())(( −−+−+++= ,  
and lowcarllowlowllllowlowi ptdftpkytduv ,, )()())(( −+−++= .  
Each households’ utility connected to owning a high emission vehicle instead of a low emission 
vehicle, ib , differ across households. Assumed that households are ranked from high to low according 
to their utility parameter, ib , and that the N  first households have chosen the high emission vehicle. 
Assume that their accumulated utility connected to owning a high-emission vehicle instead of a low-
emission vehicle, BA, is given by the expression  
(6) 2max 2
1 aNNbBA −= ,   
 where 0>a and no restrictions are imposed on maxb . Households choose the type of vehicle that 
maximizes utility. Households therefor choose the high-emission vehicle to the point where household 
number N  is indifferent between types of vehicles. This equilibrium conditions, equation (7), is 
satisfied as the utility parameter, ib , is decreasing as N is increasing.  
(7) highcarcarlhighhighlllhigh pttdftpkyaNbtdu ,max )()())(( −−+−++−+
lowcarllowlowllllow ptdftpkytdu ,)()())(( −+−++= , 
Households with a higher willingness to pay for owning a fuel intensive vehicle is going to choose a 
fuel intensive vehicle. Households with a lower willingness to pay for owning a fuel intensive vehicle 
will choose a fuel-efficient vehicle. Equation (7) determines the number of households which choose 
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the high-emission vehicle as a function of taxes on fuel and vehicles as well as exogenous parameters 
and producer prices. This equation is presented as equation (8) to simplify notations.    
(8) ),( carl ttNN = .  
The total number of households is N . Hence, the number of households that choose the low emission 
vehicle amounts to   
(9) NNNlow −=  
2.2 Costs of road traffic    
The social cost of driving consists of damage from CO2 emission and damage from mileage-related 
externalities. The damage from CO2 emission, 2COS , is determined by the number of liter fuel 
multiplied by the cost of CO2 emissions per liter fuel, 2COp .  
(10) )()()( 222 llowlowCOlhighhighCOCO tdfNNptdNfpS −+= . 
A share of the current lifetime emission from vehicles originates from production of vehicles and 
energy, se Hawkins et al. (2012). CO2-emission from production of energy and vehicles are however 
excluded from the model framework. This assumption is relevant when all polluters pay for their own 
emissions. The assumption is also relevant when such emissions are included in an emission trading 
system like EU ETS, and hence, are neutralized by adjustments in other sources of emissions.     
   
The cost of mileage-related damage, dS , is determined by the total number of kilometer driven 
multiplied by the cost of mileage-related damage per kilometer, dp .   
(11) )()()( llowdlhighdd tdNNptNdpS −+=  
 
The cost of traffic congestion and damage due to accidents is dominating, while costs of local 
pollution are more modest. These costs are influenced by a range of factors like e.g. drinking and 
driving, reckless driving and speeding. It is assumed that the present level of drinking and driving, 
reckless driving and speeding is preserved by current traffic laws and regulations.   
2.3 The government      
The government chooses the uniform tax rate on fuel and the tax on purchase of fuel-intensive 
vehicles to maximize welfare. Tax revenue collected is transferred to households. Each household 
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receive a lump-sum transfers, k . The transfer is chosen to balance the government budget constraint. 
The government budget constraint is  
(12) )()()( llowlowlcarlhighhighl tdftNNNttdfNtkN −++= . 
The welfare function is given by the sum of indirect utility functions, equation (5), minus social costs 
of traffic, equation (10) and (11), with the government budget constraint, equation (12), and the 
condition determining the allocation of vehicles, equation (8), incorporated. The government chooses 
taxes to maximize this welfare function. The problem is  
(13) 
 Maks
carl tt ,
  222max ),(2
1),())((),( COlCOllhighcarl ttaNttNbtduttNyN −++  
         ))(()),(( 2 llowCOl tduttNN −+  [ ])(),( , lhighhighlhighcarcarl tdfppttN +−  
        [ ])()),(( , llowlowllowcarcarl tdfppttNN +−−  )(),(2 lhighhighcarlCO tdfttNp−  
        )()),((2 llowlowcarlCO tdfttNNp −−  )(),( lhighcarld tdttNp−  
)()),(( llowcarld tdttNNp −−  
Note that choice of transfers, k , is excluded from the optimization problem as the government budget 
constraint is implemented into the welfare function. The first order conditions imply that  
(14) aNbtdu lhigh −+ max))(( )(, lhighhighlhighcar tdfpp −− )(2 lhighhighCO tdfp− )( lhighd tdp−
))(( llow tdu= )(, llowlowllowcar tdfpp −− )(2 llowlowCO tdfp− )( llowd tdp− , 
 
see appendix A. Second order conditions are presented in appendix B. Equation (14) shows that the 
benefit minus private and social costs of one additional high-emission vehicle equals the benefit mi-
nus private and social costs of one additional low-emission vehicle within a welfare maximizing solu-
tion. This solution is implemented by setting the tax on fuel equal to  
 
(15) 
( )
lowtlowhighthigh
dtlowthigh
COl fdNNfNd
pdNNNd
pt
ll
ll
')('
')('
2 −+
−+
+=∗ . 
 
The CO2-tax component on fuel, the first term on the right hand side of equation (15), equals the 
social cost of CO2-emissions for both types of vehicles. The road user charge on fuel, the second term 
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on the right hand side of equation (15), equals the reduction in mileage-related damage due to a 
marginal tax increase on fuel (the numerator), divided by the reduction in fuel consumption due to a 
marginal tax increase on fuel (the denominator).  Hence, the road user charge on fuel equals the 
reduction in mileage-related damage per liter fuel due to a marginal tax increase on fuel. This road 
user charge on fuel exceeds mileage-related externalities for fuel-intensive vehicles. The road user 
charge on fuel is lower than mileage-related externalities for fuel-efficient vehicles. The welfare 
maximizing tax on fuel-intensive vehicles equals   
(16) 
[ ]
*)(
'
' lhighd
lowhigh
tlow
thigh
highlow
car tdp
f
N
NNf
d
d
N
N
ff
N
NN
t
l
l −+
−
−
=∗      
[ ]
*)(
'
'
'
'
llowd
lowhigh
tlow
thigh
highlow
tlow
thigh
tdp
f
N
NNf
d
d
N
N
ff
d
d
N
N
l
l
l
l
−
+
−
+ . 
 
Both terms on the right side are negative. Hence, there should be heavier taxes on fuel-efficient vehi-
cles compared to fuel-intensive vehicles. The interpretation of these tax formulas are clarified by the 
following comparison. Assume that the tax on purchase of vehicles with poor fuel economy is set 
equal to the difference in mileage-related external costs for high and low-emission vehicles minus 
the difference in the road user charge on fuel for high and low-emission vehicles. i.e.  
 
(17) )()( llowdlhighdcar tdPtdpt −=  
       )(
'
'
'
'
lhighhighd
lowhigh
tlow
thigh
tlow
thigh
tdfp
f
N
NNf
d
d
N
N
N
NN
d
d
N
N
l
l
l
l
−
+







 −
+
−  
       )(
'
'
'
'
llowlowd
lowhigh
tlow
thigh
tlow
thigh
tdfp
f
N
NNf
d
d
N
N
N
NN
d
d
N
N
l
l
l
l
−
+







 −
+
+ . 
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A comparison with equation (16) shows that this equation is identical with the optimal tax on fuel 
intensive vehicles. The difference in road user charge on fuel for high- and low-emission vehicles that 
deviate from the difference in mileage-related damage for high- and low-emission vehicles is 
completely neutralized by the subsidy for fuel-intensive vehicles, or equivalently, the additional tax on 
fuel-efficient vehicles. These taxes on fuel and vehicles mimic the cost of externalities connected to 
each type of vehicle. Hence, household’s choice of vehicles implements the socially desirable 
allocation of vehicles given by equation (14).  
 
The model framework excludes road transport within production sectors. Tax formulas designed to 
correct for externalities from the household sector are however relevant if externalities from road 
transport within production sectors are identical with externalities from the household sector.       
2.4 A fixed stock of vehicles    
The share of newly purchased vehicles relative to the stock of vehicles is small because the life 
expectancy of vehicles is close to 20 years. The government maximization problem is altered to 
illuminate on this issue. The tax on purchase of vehicles does not influence driving distance within the 
current model framework when it is assumed that the stock of vehicles is fixed. Hence, the short run 
government maximization problem is reduced to choose the tax rate on fuel that maximizes welfare in 
this case. The problem is  
(18) 
  Maks
lt
 2max 2
1))(( aNNbtdNuyN lhigh −++  ))(()( llow tduNN −+  
       [ ])(, lhighhighlhighcar tdfppN +−  [ ])()( , llowlowllowcar tdfppNN +−−  
      )(2 lhighhighCO tdNfp−  )()(2 llowlowCO tdfNNp −−  )( lhighd tNdp−  
      )()( llowd tdNNp −− .  
 
The first order condition is identical with the first order condition that determines lt  in appendix A. 
The second order condition is presented in appendix C.    
 
(19) 
( )
lowtlowhighthigh
dtlowthigh
COl fdNNfNd
pdNNNd
pt
ll
ll
')('
')('
2 −+
−+
+=∗∗  
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Hence, the expression for the optimal tax on fuel is identical with the expression for the optimal tax on 
fuel in the case where households choose vehicle, equation (15). This shows that it is sub-optimal to 
lower the tax on fuel when households avoid the road user charge on fuel by purchasing fuel-efficient 
vehicles.        
2.5 Myopic behavior   
Empirical estimates by Allcott and Wozny (2014) show that vehicle prices move as if consumers are 
indifferent between 1 dollar in discounted future gas costs and 0.76 dollar in vehicle purchase price. 
Such myopic behavior is incorporated into the model framework in the present study by assuming that 
households value future discounted gains and costs of driving at 70 percent of actual values when 
choosing vehicle. This leads to a modified equilibrium condition where a household is indifferent 
between high- and low-emission vehicles, equation (20). The allocation of vehicles is affected by 
myopic behavior as future benefits of fuel-efficient vehicles are not fully taken into consideration 
when vehicles are purchased. Choice of driving distance is not affected because willingness to pay for 
driving and operating costs of driving take place in the same periods.   
 
(20) highcarcarlhighhighlllhigh pttdftpkyaNbtdu ,max )()(7,0))((7,0 −−+−++−+
lowcarllowlowllllow ptdftpkytdu ,)()(7,0))((7,0 −+−++=  
 
Actual future gains and costs are inflicted upon households even though they attach a lower value to 
future outcomes due to myopic behavior. The perfect-foresight government therefore maximizes an 
individualistic welfare function where actual future gains and costs are incorporated. The 
maximization problem of the government is found by replacing equation (7) with equation (20) in 
problem (13). First order conditions which determine the tax on fuel is identical with conditions in 
problem (13).  
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Hence, the optimal tax on fuel should not be modified due to myopic behavior. First order conditions 
also imply that equation (14) is satisfied. The optimal tax on purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles 
however is modified according to equation (20), see appendix D.   
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The first two terms on the right hand side are both negative, and identical with the terms in equation 
(16). The explanation is identical with the explanation in the case with rational expectation. The last 
term is positive. The explanation is that households underestimate rewards of a fuel-efficient vehicle. 
An additional tax on purchase of vehicles with higher fuel consumption contributes to correct for the 
mistakes due to myopic behavior. Which of the two effects is greatest will determine whether the 
additional tax on purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles is positive or negative.   
2.6 Electric vehicles   
A user charge on electric vehicles is desirable to correct for mileage-related externalities. This section 
however analyzes optimal taxation of fuel and purchase of electric vehicles when the use of electric 
vehicles is not taxed. The problem is analyzed within the present model framework by replacing low-
emission vehicle with electric vehicle, and by assuming that the private cost of using an electric 
vehicle is zero. Hence, driving distance for electric vehicles is determined by the condition, 0' =
lowkm
u
. CO2-emissions from production of electricity and electric vehicles are excluded.  
 
The maximization problem of the government is found by inserting 0=lowf , and by assuming that 
)( llow td is fixed in the perfect foresight problem in (13).  First order conditions imply that   
(23) dhighCOhighlkm pfpfpu high ++= 2'  
Implementing equation (23) into equation (3) gives   
(24) 
high
d
COl f
ppt +=∗∗∗∗ 2 .  
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Hence, the optimal tax wedge between fuel and other consumer goods equals the marginal damage of 
CO2 emissions plus the mileage-related marginal damage of road transport. The first order condition 
with respect to cart combined with equation (24) and (7) imply that  
(25) lowdcar kmpt −=
∗∗∗∗ .  
Equation (25) shows that the optimal additional tax on purchase of electric vehicles equals mileage-
related external costs connected to electric vehicles. The absence of a road user charge for electric 
vehicles should thus be neutralized with an equivalent tax on electric vehicles. The cost of CO2-
emissions and local external damage from driving a fossil fuel vehicle is incorporated into the price of 
fuel. Hence, costs of externalities connected with both types of vehicles are considered when 
households with rational expectations choose between fossil fuel vehicles and electric vehicles.  
 
The simple tax formula leads to strong implications. The optimal additional tax on EVs in equation 
(25) should not be lowered due to an increase in the marginal damage of CO2 emissions. The tax on 
CO2 emissions is levied on fuel consumption, equation (24), and the size does not affect the optimal 
additional tax on purchase of electric cars. The optimal additional tax on purchase of EVs in equation 
(25) should not be lowered due to range anxiety or other preferences for buying fossil fuel cars rather 
than electric cars. The producer / import prices of cars are not included in equation (25). Hence, tax 
exemptions for electric cars should not be offered to compensate for higher import prices of electric 
cars. The additional tax on purchase of EVs is equivalent to an additional yearly tax on EVs within the 
model framework.  Substantial differences in mileage-related costs between geographic regions call 
for geographic tax differentiation between regions. Implementation of geographic tax differentiation 
favor a yearly vehicle tax as differentiated taxes on purchase is more likely to be hampered by evasion.    
2.7 Other tax instruments 
The impact of introducing other policy instruments is analyzed by calculating the first-best solution 
and then evaluating which policy packages that is able to implement the first-best solution. The first 
best solution is found by maximizing the objective function in problem (13) w.r.t. the allocation of 
vehicles N and driving distance for each vehice, highkm  and lowkm . The First order conditions w.r.t 
N  imply that 
 
(26) aNbkmu high −+ max)( highhighlhighcar kmfpp −− , highhighCO kmfp 2− highd kmp− )( lowkmu=
lowlowllowcar kmfpp −− , lowlowCO kmfp 2− lowd kmp− . 
17 
 
The left hand side of equation (26) equals the utility of an extra high emission vehicle minus the costs 
of a high-emission vehicle minus damage caused by a high-emission vehicle. This equals the right 
hand side, which equals the utility of an extra low-emission vehicle minus costs connected to a low-
emission vehicle minus damage caused by a low-emission vehicle. The first order conditions also 
imply that  
(27) dhighCOhighlkm pfpfpu high ++= 2'  
and 
(28) dlowCOlowlkm pfpfpu low ++= 2' . 
The left hand side of equation (27) and (28) equals the willingness to pay for one additional kilometer 
for each type of vehicle. This equals the right hand side, which equals the price of fuel multiplied with 
consumption of fuel per kilometer plus the cost of carbon multiplied with consumption of fuel per 
kilometer plus mileage-related damage of driving one kilometer.  
 
The government is able to implement the first-best solution when the tax on fuel can be differentiated 
between vehicles with different fuel economy. Assuming rational expectations imply that the first-best 
solution is implemented by choosing a zero tax wedge between vehicles with different fuel economy, 
combined with tax rates on fuel which equals 
 
(29) 
j
d
COjl f
ppt += 2,    
 
where lowhighj ,= . The proof consist of  incorporating these tax rates into equation (3) and (7), and 
comparing with the first-best solution given by equation (26), (27) and (28). Note that the tax on fuel 
is higher for fuel-efficient vehicles in this case. Hence, the result in Montage (2015) is confirmed. The 
government is also able to implement the first-best solution with uniform tax rates on fuel and on 
driving distance based on GPS-monitoring. A tax on fuel which equals the marginal damage of CO2-
emissions, a tax on driving distance which equals the marginal damage of mileage-related 
externalities, combined with a zero tax wedge between vehicles with different fuel economy generates 
the first-best solution. Note that a user charge on electric vehicles is implemented in this case. Both 
these solutions lead to a more efficient allocation of vehicles and driving distance compared to the 
second-best solution presented above. A GPS-based system is however costly to administer, is likely 
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to impose information processing costs on motorists and represents undesirable surveillance, see Parry 
et al. (2007). A tax on fuel which is differentiated between vehicles is unable to differentiate between 
geographic locations or peak and off-peak periods, and may lead to costly monitoring to implement 
such taxes.  
3. Optimal versus current taxation of fuel and vehicles    
This section compares the optimal tax wedge between fuel and other consumer goods with tax wedges 
implemented in selected countries. The section also compares tax wedges between high- and low 
emission vehicles in selected countries with illustrations of optimal tax wedges between high- and low 
emission vehicles.          
3.1 Optimal tax estimates   
Optimal tax formulas presented are determined by both endogenous and exogenous parameters of the 
model. It is assumed that parameter values and functional forms are calibrated to fit specific solutions 
of the model. Several simplifying assumptions are adopted. First, it is assumed that the reduction in 
mileage due to a tax increase on fuel is identical for households with high- and low emission vehicles 
in optimum, i.e. ,
ll tlowthigh
dd '' = . This simplifying assumption implies that the optimal tax on fuel 
equals  
 
(30) 
lowhigh
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+
+=∗ 2 . 
Second, it is assumed that parameters are chosen so that the stock of high- and low-emission vehicles 
is identical. The optimal tax wedge between fuel and other consumer goods, presented in equation 
(30), equals the marginal damage of CO2 emissions plus the average mileage-related marginal damage 
of road traffic from fossil fuel vehicles in this case.  
 
Norway and other countries participating in the non-ETS quota system have agreed upon substantial 
GHG reductions within the non-ETS sectors, where transport is dominating. Access to flexible 
mechanisms and quota trading among participants to ensure cost effectiveness imply that emission 
targets can be reached by purchasing quotas, see European Commission (2016). The emission quota 
price therefore represents the marginal cost of carbon emissions for countries within this emission 
trading system. Future quota prices are highly uncertain, but it is desirable with at quota price which 
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equals the social cost of carbon. Note however that countries which are not obligated by climate 
treaties may end up with a marginal cost of CO2 emissions.     
 
The marginal damage of CO2 emissions, or social cost of carbon, is estimated by more than 100 peer-
reviewed studies according to the report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 
(2007). The average cost estimate is $ 43 per ton CO2. A cost estimate of 50 dollars is common as 
some resent estimates are higher. Consumption of one liter of petrol generates 2.32 kg CO2, which 
amounts to approximately 0,44 dollars per gallon of petrol. This cost estimate is adopted for the US 
and the UK. An exchange rate of 8 NOK/ dollar implies a cost of about 0.93 NOK / liter petrol6. A 
cost of 0.19 Euros / liter petrol is chosen for the German case to implement identical estimates as in 
Tscharaktschiew (2015), see table 1.  
 
Table 1: Costs and road user charges per unit of fuel, 2016.  
 The cost of 
CO2-
emissions 
Average 
mileage- 
related 
costs 
Optimal 
tax wedge, 
fuel vs. 
goods    
Current tax 
wedge, 
fuel vs. 
goods    
Current 
Fees, toll 
road   
Current 
road user 
charge, Tax 
plus fees   
USA, dollars per 
gallon petrol  
0,44 1,92 2,36 0,28  0,09 0,37 
UK, dollars per 
gallon petrol  
0,44 2,92 3,36 2,69 0 2,69 
Germany, Euros 
per liter petrol   
0,19 1,11 1,30 0,65 0  0,65 
Norway, NOK per 
liter petrol   
0,93 4,78 5,71 5,96 2,22* 8,18 
Norway, NOK per 
liter diesel   
1,06 6,53 7,59 4,56  2,22* 6,78  
*In 2015.  
 
The average mileage-related marginal damage connected to road transport for the US and UK amounts 
to 1.92 and 2.92 dollars per gallon of petrol, respectively according to Parry and Small (2005). The 
cost of traffic congestion and damage due to accidents is dominating, while costs of local pollution are 
more modest. Cost estimates in the case of Germany amounts to 1.11 Euros per liter petrol, which is 
identical with estimates in Tscharaktschiew (2015). Norwegian estimates are given by Thune-Larsen 
et al. (2016), which find that the cost of local damage due to road traffic on average amounts to 4.78 
NOK/ liter petrol and 6.53 NOK/ liter diesel.   
                                                     
6 Consumption of one liter of diesel generates 2.66 kg CO2, and a cost of about 1.06 NOK / liter diesel. 
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The optimal tax wedge between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles in the case with rational 
expectations is given by equation (16). This equation is employed to illustrate optimal tax wedges 
between the following Volkswagen Passat 2017-models: the 1.6 TDI, the 2.0 TDI DSG 4MOTION, 
the GTE plug-in hybrid. Optimal tax wedges are transformed into optimal taxes on purchase by 
assuming a zero tax on purchase of the 2.0-model. Data on fuel economy, emission, power, weight and 
optimal taxes are presented in table 27.  
 
Table 2, Technical data, Volkswagen Passat 
Model  Passat 2,0 TDI DSG 
Businessline 4MOTION 
Passat 1,6 TDI 
Businessline  
Passat GTE Plug-in 
hybrid  
*Weight, kg 1599 1410 1647 
*Power, hp  190 120 218 
*Fuel consumption l/km  0,051 0,041 0,017 (0,047) 
*CO2 g/km  134 105 39 
*Nox mg/km  49 40 3 
Optimal tax, Rational exp. Dollars 0 2942 2942 
Optimal tax, Myopic  exp. Dollars  0 2122 2122 
*Source: Volkswagen.no, 
  
The optimal tax wedge between purchases of high- and low-emission vehicles in the case with myopic 
behavior is given by equation (22). The optimal tax wedge equals the tax wedge with rational 
expectations plus 30 percent of the difference between the accumulated willingness to pay for driving 
distance minus operating costs for high- and low-emission vehicles. Thirty percent of the difference 
between accumulated willingness to pay for driving distance minus fuel costs for high- and low-
emission vehicles amounts to approximately 820 dollars, see Appendix E. Hence, the optimal 
additional tax on the 1.6-model equals 2122 dollars compared to the 2.0-model in this case. The 
optimal additional tax on the GTE also amounts to 2122 dollars in this case.   
 
Empirical evidence uncover that households have a desire to own cars with a higher value compared to 
the average value of cars, see Frank (1999) and Carlsen et al (2007). Hence, purchase of the more 
expensive 2.0-model is likely to generate negative externalities as other car owners have to compare 
their car with a higher average value of cars. Taxation designed to correct for such externalities is 
                                                     
7 It is assumed that lifetime driving distance for the 2.0 version equals 240.000 km. Fuel consumption for the 2.0- and the 
1.6- version equals 0.051 l / km and 0.041 l / km, respectively. It is also assumed that the Volkswagen Passat GTE have the 
same fuel consumption as the 1.6-model.  
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likely to lower the optimal tax wedges between the 2.0-model and the other two models. The policy 
response to conspicuous consumption is however controversial, see Becker et al. (2005).       
 
The optimal additional tax on electric vehicles is given by equation (25). The mileage-related cost per 
gallon of petrol amounts to 0.44 dollars/ gallon, see table 1. The average miles per gallon for light duty 
vehicles in 2013 amount to 21.6 according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Hence, the 
mileage- related cost amounts to approximately 5.5 cents per kilometer. The average number of miles 
per driver per year in 2014 is 13.476 according to the US department of transport (FHWA). Assuming 
that these numbers are relevant for electric vehicles imply that the optimal additional yearly tax on 
electric vehicles amounts to 1.193 dollars. The alternative is to introduce an additional tax on purchase 
of electric vehicles according to equation (25). This tax is found by calculating the present value of 
additional yearly taxes over the life time of an electric vehicle. This amounts to 14.643 dollars with a 5 
percent interest rate and a vehicle life expectancy of 18 years. The optimal additional yearly tax on 
electric vehicles in Norway is given by mileage-related damage per kilometer, 0.54 NOK / km 
according to Thune-Larsen et. al. (2016), multiplied by driving distance of approximately 14.000 km. 
This amounts to an additional yearly tax of approximately 7.000 NOK (875 Dollars). The alternative is 
an additional tax on purchase of electric vehicles of approximately 86.000 NOK when these taxes are 
distributed over the life cycle and discounted by a 5 percent interest rate.    
 
The optimal tax wedge between purchases of fossil fuel vehicles and electric vehicles in the case with 
myopic behavior equals the tax wedge with rational expectations plus 30 percent of the difference 
between the accumulated willingness to pay for driving distance minus operating costs for fossil fuel 
vehicles and electric vehicles. Thirty percent of the difference between accumulated willingness to pay 
for driving distance minus fuel costs for fossil fuel vehicles and electric vehicles is estimated to 
approximately 4.439 dollars, see appendix E. Assumptions regarding life time driving distance and 
discounting is required to calculate the per vehicle adjustment. The optimal additional tax on purchase 
of electric cars in Norway is lowered to approximately 63.000 NOK in the case with myopic behavior.  
 
Externalities connected with technological development of electric vehicles combined with a desire to 
protect domestic car industry by capturing the emerging market for electric vehicles may warrant 
subsidies for purchase of electric vehicles within large markets like Germany and the US. It is 
however challenging to quantify the externality per vehicle sold. Small car-importing countries like 
Norway are however less likely to influence the development strategies of multinational car 
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companies. The global market share is too small, and the empirical insight from other industries show 
that learning-by-exporting is non-existent according to Keller (2004).          
  
Externalities associated with the development of a network of charging stations could justify tax 
exemptions for purchase of EVs, see Greaker and Midttømme (2016). Investment- subsidies for 
charging stations, however, seem to be a more fine-tuned policy tool for such externalities. The 
financial burden on the government budget is also likely to be more modest. Such subsidies constitute 
a fraction of the lost tax revenue associated with tax exemptions for electric cars in Norway according 
Bjertnæs (2016). Direct subsidies for investments in charging stations thus appear to be less expensive. 
Additional adverse impacts of subsidies for electric vehicles, such as increased car use and less public 
transport, should also be expected, see Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014) and Aasness and Odeck 
(2015).  
3.2 The USA  
The tax wedge between fuel and other goods is given by the tax per gallon of fuel minus sales taxes 
connected to spending the money on other goods. The average US tax on petrol amounts to 45.7 cents 
per gallon in 2017 according to the US Energy Information Administration. The average combined 
sales tax (8.4 percent according to Thomson Reuters, 2015) of spending one gallon petrol worth of 
money on other goods amounts to approximately 17.8 cents. Hence, the tax wedge between fuel and 
other goods amounts to 27.9 cents per gallon of petrol.  
  
Taxes on driving also include fees on toll roads. Revenue from fees collected by US toll agencies in 
2013 amounts to 13 billion dollars according to IBTTA (2015). The total vehicle miles traveled 
(moving 12-month) amounts to approximately 3.000 billion in 2013 according to USFHA (2017). 
Hence, average toll paid per miles traveled equals 0.43 cents. The average fuel efficiency measured in 
miles per gallon of petrol for light duty vehicles in 2013 was 21.6 according to the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics. Hence, average toll per gallon of fuel consumed amounts to 9.36 cents. The 
total road user charge between fuel and other goods amounts to 37.3 cents for petrol. The optimal tax 
wedge between petrol and other goods equals 2.36 dollars per gallon, see table 1.   
 
A substantial share of the road user charge is levied on fuel in the US. Hence, it is desirable to tax 
purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles more heavily to neutralize tax avoidance according to equation (16) 
and (22). The current US tax on purchase of vehicles differs between states and counties. Sales tax and 
registration fees on purchase of vehicles are common in most states. Local governments collect an 
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additional sales tax. Registration and documentation fees are also common. These taxes and fees 
generate a marginal tax wedge between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles, and hence, do not 
neutralize tax avoidance of road user charges.  
Fees on toll roads for electric vehicles differ between states in the US. The road user charge for 
electric vehicles is however marginal. Hence, it is optimal to tax purchase of electric vehicles more 
heavily compared to fossil fuel vehicles according to equation (25). Tax credits and rebates on 
purchase of electric vehicles are in contrast introduced in the US market. The federal tax credit per 
new electric vehicle range from 2.500 to 7.500 dollars according to the US department of energy. 
Many states offer additional benefits, including support for charging stations. California e.g. offer an 
additional 7.000 dollars cash rebate for low income households who purchase an electric vehicle.  
Some states have however replaced subsidies with additional annual fees ranging from 50 to 300 
dollars for electric vehicles to compensate for the lack of a road user charge.  
3.3 The UK  
The tax wedge between petrol and other consumer goods in the UK amounts to the fuel tax of 0.5795 
pounds per liter petrol, or 2.69 dollars per gallon, se UK (2017). The additional value added tax is 
levied on most goods, and hence, do not influence the tax wedge. There is toll on selected roads and 
bridges as well as the London (and Durham) congestion charge. Revenue from these road user charges 
divided by total vehicle miles amounts to only 0.002 pounds per vehicle miles in 2007, se uk (2009). 
Vehicles above 12 ton pay a road user charge in the UK. This fee is however paid together with 
vehicle excise duty, and hence, is not based on driving distance. The current tax wedge between petrol 
and other goods, 2.69 dollars per gallon, is below the optimal tax wedge, 3.36 dollars per gallon of 
petrol, see table 1.     
 
The tax on fuel amounts to almost 100 percent of the road user charge in the UK, and there is no road 
user charge for electric vehicles. Hence, it is desirable to tax purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles more 
heavily to neutralize avoidance of the road user charge on fuel. The current tax design however 
deviates substantially as the current tax increases with the theoretical CO2-emission per kilometer, see 
UK (2015). A 4.000 pound subsidy on purchase of electric cars with sufficient range is also introduced 
according to the UK government web site gov.com. Hence, current UK tax rebates and subsidies for 
purchase of electric cars deviate substantially from the optimal additional tax on purchase of electric 
cars according to equation (25).         
24 
3.4 Germany   
The tax wedge between petrol and other consumer goods amounts to 0.65 Euros per liter petrol in 
Germany. The additional value added tax is levied on most goods, and hence, do not influence the tax 
wedge. Vehicles above 7.5 ton pay a road user charge based on driving distance in Germany. Such 
vehicles are mainly propelled by diesel. Germany and the European Commission have reached an 
agreement on a road charge scheme for lighter vehicles. This road charge is based on annual fees 
combined with short-term allowances to facilitate temporary needs. The current tax wedge between 
petrol and other goods, 0.65 Euros per liter, constitutes approximately half of the optimal tax wedge, 
1.30 Euros per liter of petrol.   
 
The tax on fuel amounts to almost 100 percent of the road user charge for petrol cars in Germany. 
Hence, it is optimal to tax purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles more heavily to neutralize avoidance of 
the road user charge on fuel. The current tax design however deviates substantially as there are 
additional taxes on purchase of vehicles with higher theoretical fuel consumption per kilometer, see 
VDIK (2017).  
 
A 4.000 Euro subsidy on purchase of electric vehicles, and a 3.000 Euro subsidy on purchase of plug-
in hybrid vehicles are introduced in Germany to achieve the goal of 1 million electric vehicles on 
German roads within 2020. Leading automakers have agreed to finance 50 percent of this subsidy 
scheme. Premium cars like Tesla model S and X are not eligible for the subsidy as the price of these 
cars exceeds the 60.000 Euro price limit. Electric cars are also partly exempt from the vehicle tax in 
Germany. Hence, current German tax rebates and subsidies for purchase of electric cars deviate 
substantially from the optimal additional tax on purchase of electric cars given by equation (25). The 
rebates are however designed to protect the domestic car industry and to promote development of 
clean transport technology.  
3.5 Norway  
The tax wedge between fuel and other consumer goods in Norway includes a tax of 5.96 and 4.56 
NOK per liter petrol and diesel, respectively. The additional value added tax is levied on most goods, 
and hence, do not influence the tax wedge. Revenue from toll roads amounts to 9.3 billion NOK in 
2015 according to the State Road Administration. The total consumption of fuel for road use amounts 
to 4.18 billion liters in Norway in 2015. Hence, this amounts to 2.22 NOK / liter fuel. The current total 
tax wedge between petrol and other goods in 2016, 8.18 NOK per liter, exceeds the optimal tax wedge 
25 
of 5.71 NOK per liter. The current total tax wedge between diesel and other goods, 6.78 NOK per 
liter, is lower than the optimal tax wedge of 7.59 NOK per liter.    
 
A substantial share of the road user charge is levied on fuel in Norway. Hence, it is desirable to tax 
purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles more heavily to neutralize road user charge avoidance. The current 
tax design however deviates substantially as there are additional taxes on purchase of vehicles with 
higher theoretical fuel consumption per kilometer. The current vehicle tax on purchase of the 
Volkswagen Passat 1.6 TDI model is 58.849 NOK (7.350 dollars) below the tax on the 2.0-model 
within the Norwegian tax system. The optimal vehicle tax on the 1.6-model is 17-24.000 NOK (2.122-
2.942 dollars) above the 2.0-model. The current vehicle tax on purchase of the GTE model is 124.570 
NOK below the tax on the 2.0-model. The optimal vehicle tax on the GTE model is 17-24.000 NOK 
above the 2.0-model.  The average Norwegian tax on purchase of petrol/ diesel cars in 2014 amounts 
to 135.000 NOK when the value added tax is included according to Bjertnæs (2016). The annual 
vehicle tax amounts to approximately 3000 NOK for petrol/ diesel cars. Hence, the optimal yearly tax 
on electric cars which is consistent with equation (25) amounts to approximately 10.000 NOK when 
the average tax on purchase of electric cars amounts to 135.000 NOK. The optimal average tax on 
purchase of electric vehicles in the absence of a yearly tax on cars amounts to approximately 221.000 
NOK. The optimal average tax on purchase of electric cars is lowered to approximately 198.000 NOK 
in the case with myopic behavior. Purchase of battery electric cars is in contrast exempt from all taxes 
in Norway. The yearly tax only amount to 455 NOK for electric cars, and the tax on electricity only 
amounts to approximately 500 NOK. EV owners also enjoy implicit subsidies in the form of 
permission to drive in bus lanes, free parking and charging in public spaces and free toll roads.  
4. Conclusion  
Many countries have implemented taxes on fuel to curb externalities linked to both fuel (CO2 
emissions) and road use (local air pollution, accidents, congestion and noise). The gain of reduced 
externalities per liter fuel is however diminished as households avoid the mileage-related tax by 
purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. Parry and Small (2005) claims that the optimal tax rate 
component on fuel designed to curb mileage-related externalities is halved due to such tax avoidance, 
and conclude that the optimal tax rate on petrol in the United States was more than twice as large as 
the current rate, while that for the United Kingdom was about half its current rate. This study shows 
that both the US and the UK tax wedge between fuel and other consumer goods is lower than the 
optimal tax wedge, as the mileage-related tax rate component on fuel should not be reduced due to 
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such tax avoidance. Such avoidance should be neutralized by a higher tax on fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Many countries have, in contrast, introduced tax exemptions or subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles.   
 
The study also shows that the lack of road user charges for electric cars implies that the optimal 
additional tax on electric cars equals their lifetime value of mileage-related externalities when other 
market imperfections are absent. Substantial tax exemptions and or subsidies for purchase of electric 
vehicles are in contrast introduced in several countries. This optimal additional tax is not lowered by 
an increase in the damage of CO2-emissions as such externalities are corrected for by a tax on fuel. 
The optimal additional tax is however reduced in the presence of myopic behavior. A desire to protect 
the domestic car industry and to promote development of clean transport technology may also justify 
some subsidies for purchase of electric vehicles, especially within large car-producing countries like 
Germany and the US. The case for subsidies is less convincing for small car-importing countries like 
Norway, with no car industry, limited possibilities to influence the future transport technology, and 
subsidies for charging stations to harvest potential network-effects.   
 
The problem with avoidance of road user charges on fuel is removed if such charges are replaced with 
GPS-based road user charges designed to trace externalities. A GPS-based system is however more 
costly to administer, is likely to impose information processing costs and undesirable surveillance, see 
Parry et al. (2007). A road user charge based on odometer readings or pay-as-you-drive insurance does 
not differentiate between locations or peak and off-peak periods, and is exposed to evasion. 
Congestion charges and toll roads allow for peak-load pricing, but are costly to administer, and leads 
to undesirable traffic planning designed to avoid toll stations, see Parry (2002). A tax on fuel which 
differentiates between various characteristics of vehicles, so that the tax equals the marginal damage 
of driving, provides optimal incentives for mileage, economical driving style and choice of vehicle, 
see Fullerton and West (2002) and Montag (2015). Such taxes however do not differentiate between 
geographic locations or peak and off-peak periods, and may lead to costly monitoring to prevent that 
high-tax fuel vehicles use low-tax fuel. The choice of policy tools to curb externalities from road 
transport is complex. New improved technology may however remove hurdles for tools like GPS-
based pricing.    
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First order equations w.r.t.  
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Implementing first order conditions v.r.t. cart  gives   
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Both expressions on the right hand side are negative. This proves that ∗cart is negative.  
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Second order conditions for the government maximization problem, equations (13). The welfare 
function is labeled W.  
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The second order condition is satisfied if 
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The first inequality condition is satisfied if 0>a .  
The second inequality condition is satisfied when  
llllll tthighhighltthighkmthighthighkmkmcarl
dfpdudduttN
a
''''''''')[,(1 −+−
ll tthighhighCO
dfp ''2−
llll tlowtlowkmkmtthighd
ddudp '''''' −−  
llll ttlowlowlttlowkm
dfpdu ''''' +−
ll ttlowlowCO
dfp ''2+ ]'' ll ttlowd dp+  
[1 N
a
−
ll tlowtlowkmkm
ddu ''''
llll ttlowlowlttlowkm
dfpdu ''''' −+
ll ttlowlowCO
dfp ''2−  
]''
ll ttlowd
dp−
ll thighhighlthighkm
dfpdu
a
'''[12 −− lthighhighCO dfp '2− lthighd dp '−
ll tlowlowltlowkm
dfpdu ''' +−
ltlowlowCO
dfp '2+ 0]'
2 >+
ltlowd
dp  
Parameter values and functional forms are restricted to those that satisfy this condition. These 
restrictions are also sufficient to satisfy the second order conditions in the case with myopic behavior.     
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Second order conditions for the government maximization problem, equations (19). 
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Parameter values and functional forms are restricted to those that satisfy this condition.  
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Equation (20) is modified so that   
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The only difference between this condition and equation (7) is the first term on the left hand side. 
Hence, implementing equation (21) and (14) imply that  
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Implementing equation (21) imply that   
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Appendix E  
A linear approximation of the accumulated demand for driving distance minus total private fuel costs 
for low-emission vehicles equals the area abc in Figure 1F. Accumulated demand for driving distance 
minus total private fuel costs for vehicles with high fuel consumption equals the area cde. Hence, the 
difference between the accumulated demand for driving distance minus total private fuel costs for 
high- and low-emission vehicles equals the area abde. Implementing estimates of current prices, taxes, 
driving and fuel consumption, 4924,0=lp  dollars, 6234,0=lt dollars, 051,0=





highkm
l , 
041,0=





lowkm
l , 000.240=highkm , 000.250=lowkm , imply that the area abde equals 2.733,71 
dollars. Thirty percent of 2.733,71 amount to approximately 820 dollars. The case with electric 
vehicles is implemented by assuming that 0=





lowkm
l   and 000.280=lowkm . The area abde 
becomes 14.796 dollars in this case. Thirty percent of 14.796 approximately equals 4.439 dollars.  
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